We describe a simple, but powerful local encoding technique, implying two surprising results:
INTRODUCTION
Suppose we want to represent a vector A[1 . . n], where each element comes from some finite alphabet Σ. The optimal space is n log 2 Σ bits, 1 and it can be achieved by treating the vector as a big number between 0 and Σ n − 1, and converting this number to binary. Unfortunately, this encoding has very poor locality: (1) we cannot encode a stream of symbols with a low-memory algorithm; (2) we cannot read or write a single element A[i] faster than decoding the entire vector.
In this paper, we give a surprisingly simple technique that solves both of these problems optimally. We can represent A using n log 2 Σ bits, while reading/writing A[i] in constant time. Additionally, given a stream of symbols in Σ, we can encode (and later decode) it into a binary stream of optimal size, while using O(log(nΣ)) bits of memory and constant processing time per symbol. As an unexpected application of this result, we show how to encode/decode a stream of a-priori unknown length in a prefix-free manner, using essentially optimal overhead and memory.
Representing a Vector
The field of succinct data structures is preoccupied with representing data in close to optimal space, while still supporting useful queries. Representing a vector to support reads and writes to individual entries is perhaps the most foundational problem in the field, and thus has been a toy problem of particular interest.
The naïve way of supporting local access is to encode each element separately using log 2 Σ bits (cf. Hamming codes versus arithmetic codes). This has a redundancy of Ω(n) bits when Σ is not a power of two; for instance, it wastes around 0.68n bits for decimal digits, Σ = {0, 1, . . . , 9}.
Standard techniques in succinct data structure, dating back to [17] , could achieve constant access time using n log 2 Σ + O(n/ log n) bits of space. More recently, Golynski et al. [12] proposed an encoding with O(n/ log 2 n) redundancy and constant access time. Pǎtraşcu [21] showed how to use recursion in succinct encodings, and achieved query time O(t) with a redundancy of O(n/( log n t ) t ). Setting t = O(1), we get redundancy n/ log O(1) n with constant query time.
For a growing body of problems, we have strong redundancy lower bounds of Ω(n/t) [13] , Ω(n/t 2 ) [15] , or n/ log O(t) n [22] . Combining this with the non-locality of known optimal encodings (e.g., arithmetic coding described in Section 1.3), one may conjecture that any representation of a vector will require some nontrivial trade-off between the redundancy and query time.
In this paper, we show that this is not the case, and a surprising optimal result is possible: Theorem 1. On a Word RAM, one can represent a vector A[1 . . n] of elements from a finite alphabet Σ using n log 2 Σ bits, such that any element of the vector can be read or written in constant time. The data structure requires O(log n) precomputed word constants.
From a conceptual perspective, the statement that a binary computer can represent data in any radix with no penalty has an inherent appeal.
From a theoretical perspective, our result forms a nice contrast with the lower bounds of [22] . An overwhelming majority of succinct data structures rely crucially on the so-called rank/select problem. But it is proved in [22] that the redundancy needs to be at least n/ log O(t) n, essentially matching the upper bound [21] . Two scenarios are plausible: either (1) the use of rank/select is inherent, and we need stronger lower bound techniques that apply to a broader class of problems; or (2) one can surpass the rank/select barrier by alternative techniques.
In this paper, we illustrate scenario (2) for a natural, central question. One can hope that this opens the door to further improvements. For example, an important target is the dictionary problem (a.k.a. set membership) -perhaps the most important remaining open problem in this fieldwhere the state-of-the-art remains [21] .
Further discussion. The model of computation throughout this paper is the Word RAM, which is meant to formalize what is possible in imperative programming languages. The memory allows random access, and is organized into words of w bits, where w = Ω(log n) in order to allow indices and pointers. A standard set of unit-cost operations is specified (in this paper, we only require addition, multiplication, and division).
In the (unrealistic but mathematically cleaner) bit-probe model, Viola [25] has recently shown that, if the query is allowed t bit probes, the redundancy must be at least n/2 O(t) . Our new result provides a matching upper bound: simply simulate the actions of a RAM with t-bit words.
It is unclear whether the abstract vector-representation problem has direct applications in practice. Applications to compressed Bloom filters are suggested by [18] . In addition, extreme compression is of interest in current database applications. In many databases, columns have few common possibilities (as few as 3-5), so they can be compressed to an alphabet with these possibilities plus a letter indicating "other." After pruning many rows using indexes, database queries degenerate into linear scans over ranges, and such scans are often memory-bound. Thus, it is worth using a (slightly) more CPU intensive algorithm for tighter compression of the records. In this context, not wasting one bit for small fields might be valuable. We mention that algorithms that exploit packing small fields into bits are currently deployed in a large commercial database [24, 16] ; in fact, this was the initial motivation behind our theoretical investigation.
Online Prefix-Free Encoding
Suppose one is to represent some n bits of information using a prefix-free code, where n is not fixed (i.e. it should be implicitly included in the code). In information theory, this task is known as universal coding, whereas in Computer Science, the term "prefix-free" is more often used (ambiguously). The term "self-delimiting code" is also in use.
The textbook solution to this problem is given by Elias codes. For example, to encode a vector of n bits using the Elias delta-code, one can write: (1) as many zeros as there are bits in log 2 n, followed by a one; (2) the number n written in binary, using as many bits as indicated in part 1; (3) the n bits of data. This achieves n + O(log n) bits, for any n. Applying this idea recursively, one obtains the Elias omega-code, which represents n input bits using n + log 2 n + log 2 log 2 n + · · · + O(log n) output bits. This bound is optimal.
Prefix-free encodings are essential for communicating or storing any type of data, except fixed-size records. Less obviously, prefix-free encodings are often essential to ensure security of iterative constructions in cryptography, such as CBC-MAC [6] and cascade constructions [14, 4, 10, 20] . In particular, prefix-freeness gives the simplest provably-secure counter-measure to various forms of extension attacks on hash functions, message authentication codes and pseudorandom functions, as discussed in Appendix A.
In many natural applications, including those in cryptography, the message comes online, as a stream of bits, and the length of the stream is not known in advance. Elias codes are unusable in this setting. Instead, one wishes to design a simple code that can be encoded and decoded in one pass by algorithms maintaining small state (ideally, O(log n) bits), and using lower overhead (ideally, O(1) time per input word).
In practice, one typically assumes that the input comes in large blocks, say, b = 128 bits; the last block may be padded if it is incomplete. Then, one can append one bit after each block, indicating whether we have reached the end of file. With b = 128, this code has an overhead of almost 1%, which is acceptable, but a fairly steep price to pay just for encoding the length of the stream. More problematically, many cryptographic standards include workarounds that eliminate the need for prefix-freeness, creating theoretical and practical burdens.
In theory, the naïve block-based solution gives a linear trade-off between redundancy and the space of the algorithm, by buffering b bits (e.g., one block) of input, and including an end-of-file marker before each block.
Maurer and Sjödin [20] conjectured that a linear redundancy might be necessary for small-space online prefix-free encoding. This would explain why cryptographic standards tend to use ad hoc solutions instead, since a proportional increase in the stream size is unacceptable. Fortunately, we disprove this conjecture, by constructing a simple prefix-free code with ideal space and running time.
As the first step, we point out the fallacy in the linear trade-off between space and redundancy: thinking in terms of integral bits. Let us imagine that the stream consists of n blocks of b bits each, and we are guaranteed that n ≤ 2 b . We can augment the alphabet of [2 b ] with an end-offile symbol, eof, making the stream prefix-free. If we can efficiently move from this alphabet of 2 b + 1 to a binary alphabet (not wasting one bit per block), then the stream will take (n + 1) log 2 (2 b + 1) bits. This means an overhead of (n + 1) log 2 (2
Since we were guaranteed n ≤ 2 b , the overhead is b + O(1). To remove this assumption, we can use slowly growing blocks ("guessing" n up to a factor of two). This gives an overhead of O(log n).
In this paper, we give an efficient online algorithm that converts base 2 b + 1 to base 2 b (or, equivalently, to binary), thus refuting the conjecture of [20] . In fact, we describe two solutions in Sections 2 and 5.
The first algorithm assumes b ≥ 2 log 2 n + 2 and wastes at most two blocks. It benefits from extreme simplicity and very fast running time, so we expect it to be the method of choice in practical implementations. A slightly more complicated version of the algorithm achieves optimal encoding size (n + 1 blocks) as long as b ≥ 2 log 2 n + 3.
Our algorithm has excellent locality properties. During normal operation, the algorithm outputs a pair of blocks for each pair of blocks it reads. This takes constant processing time, and the memory maintained is O(1) blocks. At the end of the file, the algorithm outputs the last O(1) blocks of the encoding, which is now guaranteed to be prefix-free. The decoding algorithm has the same behavior. We can also decode or modify any block by reading/writing only O(1) code blocks. In addition, we can append to the stream or delete blocks from the end in O(1) time.
In Section 5, we consider the case of binary streams, and show how to match the optimal Elias bound up to O(log log n):
Theorem 2. There exists a universal code mapping n bits to n + log 2 n + O(log log n) bits, which can be encoded and decoded by algorithms that use O(log n) bits of space and take O(1) time per operation.
Applications to Cryptography. As we already mentioned, prefix-free encodings (PFEs) are also essential for proving security of many natural cryptographic constructions which need to process variable-length messages. We will give many popular examples in Appendix A, but start with explaining the general reason why PFEs are useful in this context. In all such constructions, one first designs a "secure" compression function f : {0, 1} s × {0, 1} b → {0, 1} s , where b is called the block-length, and s is called the bufferlength. (Depending on the application, such f could be keyed or unkeyed, as we survey in Appendix A.) Intuitively, though, f allows one to securely process short, b-bit messages: given an initial buffer IV ∈ {0, 1} s (which could be a key or a fixed constant), the hash of m ∈ {0, 1} b is simply y = f (IV, m). Then, to process an arbitrarily long message M , one first splits M into b-bits blocks m1 . . . mn (so n ≈ |M |/b), 2 and then iteratively process M via the cascade mode-of-operation, parameterized by the compression function f and the initialization vector IV ∈ {0, 1} s (see Figure 1 ):
Split M into b-bit blocks m1 . . . mn, where mi ∈ {0, 1} b and n = |M |/b ; 2 We will assume that |M | is a multiple of b. If not, one can always pad M with 1 followed by several (at most (b − 1)) zeros to make the last block mn full. Hence, w.l.o.g. we The Cascade Mode of Operation Cascade(M, f, IV ).
Typically, one can prove the following result: if the compression function f is "secure" and M is encoded in prefixfree form, then Cascade(M, f, IV ) is "secure" (where IV is either a cryptographic key or a constant, depending on the application). Intuitively, one can imagine building 2 b -ary tree T , whose root is labeled by the IV , and each internal node m1 . . . mn at "depth" n is labeled by Cascade(m1 . . . mn, f, IV ). Typically, f is designed in a way that its ancestor-descendant node pairs might be related in a "meaningful way" (e.g.,
, while all other pairs of nodes are not related. Thus, if no two messages M1 and M2 are in the ancestor-descendant relationship, then the construction is secure. But this precisely corresponds to the fact that the messages are encoded in a prefix-free way.
Moreover, in all known examples (see Appendix A), one can actually break the security of the construction if the PFE constraint is not enforced. Such attacks are typically referred to as extension attacks. Of course, if efficient one-line PFEs were known, one can easily prevent extension attacks using an on-line PFE. Unfortunately, since prior to our work it was believed (and explicitly conjectured by [20] ) that oneline PFE comes at a significant cost, extension attacks are typically handled using various ad-hoc methods, different for each specific application. Specific examples are discussed in Appendix A, and include CBC-MAC [6] , cascade pseudorandom functions [4], Merkle-Damgård hash functions [10] , domain extension of message authentication codes [20] and multi-property preservation [7, 8] . In each of these examples, applying the cascade transform to the prefix-free encoding of the message gives the simplest-to-understand domain extension for the given cryptographic application. Thus, one application of our results is that previously used ad hoc methods might not be necessary in these applications.
Comparison to Arithmetic Coding
From an information-theoretic view point, the standard approach to converting from one base to another is arithmetic coding. To encode n independently chosen symbols from some distribution D, arithmetic codes use n · H(D) + O(1) bits in expectation, where H(·) denotes binary entropy.
In our case, D is the uniform distribution over an alphabet Σ, so n log 2 Σ + O(1) bits are used. Unfortunately, a closer look at arithmetic coding reveals that it does not have the kind of worst-case locality properties that our applications require.
The basic idea in arithmetic coding is to map the space of possible inputs A to the interval [0, 1]. To represent the first letter, [0, 1] is broken into |Σ| intervals, and each letter a ∈ Σ gets an interval of length pD(a). The process continues recursively, subdividing the interval corresponding to A[1] in order to represent A[2], etc. After the (tiny) interval corresponding to A has been identified, one simply outputs the shortest binary number inside it.
The challenge is to implement this conceptual idea efficiently with bounded precision arithmetic. The ubiquitous implementation, due to Witten et al. [26, 19] , can perform encoding and decoding of a stream in O(1) time per bit, using O(log n) space.
It is instructive to briefly review this algorithm, as it highlights the inherently non-local nature of arithmetic codes. Imagine encoding a stream of symbols sequentially, and maintaining a subinterval of [0, 1] that represents the data so far. Whenever the interval is fully contained in [0, ], a zero bit can be output, and we can re-normalize [0, , 1], a one bit is output and we map [ + ε] for exponentially small ε. The trick of [26, 19] is to re-normalize [ ]. Since the next bit is not known, the algorithm simply increments a counter of "outstanding bits." When the interval finally gets below or above the middle point, a burst of zeros or ones is written.
This demonstrates that the encoding of one particular character may depend non-trivially on many surrounding characters. It is thus impossible, for worst-case data, to access a symbol in the middle of the vector without linear decoding time. For prefix-free encoding/decoding, arithmetic coding would lead to bursty behavior where many blocks may be written after one block is read.
Organization
In Section 2, we begin by describing a very simple algorithm for prefix-free encoding in the streaming model. This algorithm assumes that the input comes in blocks of b ≥ 2 log 2 n + 2 bits, and outputs a code of at most n + 3 blocks (or, n + 1 blocks with a more complicated algorithm). While restrictive, this scenario is of interest in cryptography, where common message authentication schemes work with at least 128 bits at a time. The algorithm is very simple, and we expect it to be the practical choice for these application.
Using the intuition from this algorithm, we formulate a general concept (information carriers) in Section 3. Used appropriately, this construct implies an optimal data structure for representing a vector (Section 4), and an online prefixfree encoding of size n + log 2 n + O(log log n) (Section 5).
THE SOLE PREFIX-FREE ENCODING
For the simplest algorithm, assume that the input stream consists of blocks of b ≥ 2 log 2 n + 2 bits, and that n is odd (we can pad with an additional eof block otherwise). Under these conditions, our algorithm will output an encoding of n + 2 blocks. For each block, the algorithm uses O(1) arithmetic operations on b-bit integers.
Let B = 2 b be the alphabet of a block, and we write [B] to denote the range {0, . . . , B − 1}. Adding a special end-of-file symbol (eof), we obtain an alphabet of size B + 1. Our goal is to encode n + 1 letters from this alphabet (including the final eof) using n + 2 blocks of b bits. The algorithm is best illustrated by Figure 2 . Intuitively, it is simplest to view the algorithm as two separate passes through the stream.
In Pass 1, we consider pairs of elements on positions (2i + 1, 2i + 2), for i ≥ 0. Grouped together, the elements form a number in range (B + 1)
2 . We decompose this number into two values: one in range B −3i , and one in range B + 3i + 3 . The smaller range is placed on odd positions, while the larger one on even positions, hence the name "Short-Odd Long-Even (SOLE) 3 Encoding." The decomposition is simply a division by B − 3i, using the remainder as the first block and the quotient as the next one. The transformation is valid as long as:
which easily follows from the fact that i ≤ n+1 2 and B ≥ 4n 2 . In Pass 2, we regroup the elements, considering pairs on positions (2i, 2i + 1) for i ≥ 1. These elements come from range B + 3i and B − 3i , respectively. Since (B + 3i)(B − 3i) < B 2 , we can group them together as a number in range [B 2 ]. This uses a multiplication by B + 3i. Hence, we have obtained 2b bits (a "double-block"), which we output immediately.
It is clear that these two conceptual passes can be implemented as a single pass in an online streaming algorithm. We simply need to remember the state of each pass (at most two integers each). The decoding algorithm is the straightforward inversion of this process, implementing Figure 2 bottom-up. One can immediately observe the following locality property:
Property 3. Output blocks 2i and 2i+1 can be computed from input blocks 2i − 1, . . . , 2i + 2. Input blocks 2i + 1 and 2i + 2 can be decoded from output blocks 2i, . . . , 2i + 3.
Termination. An important component of the algorithm that we have not described is the termination behavior, once eof is received. We assumed that n was odd, i.e. eof appears at some even position n + 1 = 2i. The final element after Pass 1 is in range B + 3i . We artificially insert a zero value in range B − 3i into the stream output by Pass 1. After regrouping and Pass 2, this completes a double-block at positions 2i and 2i + 1, which is output.
When the decoding algorithm has decoded the eof symbol, it stops immediately. Thus, we need to argue that the decoding stops before reading past the end of the encoded file. This follows from Property 3, as the last block needed in the decoding of eof is 2i + 1.
Additional properties. Based on Property 3, one can support random access to the encoding in constant time. Decoding a block in the middle of the file requires reading 4 output blocks. Modifying an input block will read and change 4 consecutive output blocks. For instance, to modify block 3 in Figure 2 , we first read output blocks 2, . . . , 5. From these, we compute the input block 4, and blocks 2 and 5 output by Pass 1. From the new value of block 3 and the old block 4, we can rerun Pass 1 to update the intermediate blocks 3 and 4. We now know the intermediate blocks 2,. . . , 5, so the output blocks can be computed by running Pass 2. Appending to the file and truncating can be reduced to write operations.
A tighter encoding. The previous algorithm wasted up to 3 blocks (when n is even). If n ≥ 2 and b ≥ 2 log 2 n + 3, we can instead obtain an optimal encoding that always uses n + 1 output blocks. The first idea is to conceptually insert the eof symbol two blocks before the actual termination of the input stream. This can be done by buffering the last two blocks, and ensures that eof will be followed by two output blocks. Hence, by Property 3, the usual decoding algorithm will certainly observe the eof without reading past the end of the encoding. At this point, we switch to a special termination procedure for the last two blocks.
Imagine that, after eof appearing on position n − 1, and the last two blocks on positions n and n + 1, an infinite stream of zeros follows in the input stream. Then, it is not hard to see that block n + 2 of the usual encoding will be 0 or 1 (henceforth "the final bit"), and the remaining blocks are guaranteed to be zero. In the new algorithm, we will output the usual output values of blocks up to n + 1.
Instead of wasting block n + 2 for the final bit, we will use the following hack: we will have two end-of-file symbols, eof0 and eof1, coding this bit. We note that there is no circular dependence, since block n + 2 (the final bit) does not depend on block n − 1 (the eof) by Property 3. The price we pay is increasing the alphabet to B + 2, instead of B + 1. Now ranges of the form [B ± 3i] become [B ± 5i]. The encoding is possible as long as:
, this requires b ≥ 2 log 2 n + 3. This scheme is further improved in Section 5, which also uses multiple eof symbols, and moves eof ahead of the file termination.
Practical considerations. To ensure fast arithmetic operations, one would set b = 32 or b = 64. While the algorithm uses arithmetic on double precision (2b bits), it is standard to implement division and multiplication by 2 b ± x using fast, single-precision operations.
For a given b, our basic algorithm can process a stream of up to n0 = 2 b/2−1 blocks. For n > n0 blocks, we can trivially obtain an encoding with overhead n n 0 +O(1) blocks, by applying SOLE on each chunk of n0 blocks. Specifically, one block is wasted for each chunk except the last one, where 3 blocks may be wasted.
With a minimal setting of b = 32 bits, our encoding adds a block (4 bytes) per each 2 15 = 32, 768 blocks (128Kb), making our overhead roughly 2 −15 ≈ 0.003%. For comparison, the naïve encoding will waste 1 bit per block, which is 1 32 = 3.125%, a factor of 1024 worse than our encoding. E.g., a 32Gb file will have a negligible 1Mb overhead with 
INFORMATION CARRIERS
Let us re-examine the behavior of SOLE encodings for intuition. After seeing 2n blocks, the algorithm has written 2n − 1 blocks to the output, and is left with a number in range B + 3n . In keeping with the terminology of [21] , we shall call this number a spill.
The algorithm proceeds by grabbing two more blocks, i.e. a number in (B + 1)
2 . Its first worry is to complete the spill with some information, to obtain two full blocks of output. That means that the spill must be combined with a value in range ≈ B + 3n + 3. This is the new spill. More abstractly, imagine the current spill as a value y in some range [Y ] . We would like to store y immediately, but, unfortunately, the range [Y ] is not a power of two, so we cannot simply write y to memory without losing entropy. Instead, we use some unrelated x in some appropriately bigger range [X] as an "information carrier." The purpose of x is to help commit y to memory without much waste. The pair (x, y) is injectively mapped into the immediate output m and the next spill s, such that:
• m comes from some range [2 M ], meaning that it can be written to memory in bits, without losing entropy;
• m stores enough information to recover the old spill y we care about, meaning that y can be immediately recovered from memory.
• the entropy loss of going from (x, y) to (m, s) can be made arbitrarily small, by making the range [X] of the information carrier appropriately large.
For instance, in the SOLE encoding, we had Y = B +3n. By making X = (B + 1) 2 , we could store the spill y in M = 2b bits of memory, and the new spill s had only a marginally larger range [S] = [B + 3n + 3]. This means that the entropy loss of this operation was at most log 2 (B +3n+3)−log 2 (B + 3n) = O(1/B) bits.
The discussion above motivates us to formulate the following general lemma, where we optimized the parameters M and S to minimize the entropy loss: • S and M are chosen as functions of X and Y , but
• the map can be evaluated in O(1) time;
• x can be decoded from m and s, in O(1) time;
• y can be decoded from m alone, in O(1) time;
• the redundancy of this encoding scheme is:
The lemma could be graphically depicted by Figure 4 . The current spill value y is combined with the information carrier x, producing the memory content m (from which one can recover y) and the new spill value s.
Proof. Say we will use M memory bits. The entire information about y must be in these M bits. In addition to y, the bits can store a quantity from the universe C = 2 M /Y . The redundancy in doing this rounding is at most:
Now x is broken into two components: a value in the universe [C], to be combined with y, and a spill of size S = X/C . This decomposition introduces a redundancy of:
Balancing the two redundancies, R1 = R2, we find that we should set C = Θ( √ X) and obtain R1 = R2 = O(
). The overall redundancy is, by the chain rule:
M + log 2 S − log 2 X + log 2 Y = M − log 2 Y − log 2 C + log 2 C + log 2 S − log 2 X) = R1 + R2.
Mapping (x, y) to (m, s) takes one division and one multiplication. (We assume here that X and Y are fixed, so constant like C are precomputed.) Extracting y from m takes one division, and extracting x from (m, s) takes one division and one multiplication. In practice, it is standard to replace any integer division by a constant with two multiplications (precomputing the multiplicative inverse to w bits of precision).
REPRESENTING A VECTOR

A First Attempt
We now turn to the problem of representing a vector A[1 . . n] of elements from Σ, supporting local access. A direct approach is to simply iterate Lemma 4. Formally, we group elements of A into blocks of size O(log Σ n), so that each block can be interpreted as an element x in range [X], where X = Θ(n 2 ). This gives us N = O(n/ log Σ n) larger elements x1, . . . , xN from a universe of size Θ(n 2 ). Initially, we start with a null spill, Y0 = 0. Applying the lemma, we obtain some memory bits M0 (which we write to memory), and some spill Y1. Then, we store the spill from Y1 by using x2 as the information carrier, and obtain a spill Y2, etc. Observe that, while the spill size Yi may depend non-trivially on Yi−1, our lemma guarantees that Yi = O( √ X), i.e. the spill universe doesn't grow without bounds.
The redundancy introduced in each step is O(1/ √ X) = O(1/n). Thus, the overall redundancy is O( N n ) = o(1), plus one bit at the end, when we simply write down the last spill. To prove this formally, note that our definition of redundancy admits a chain rule:
To read an element A[i], we first calculate to which xj it belongs. Then, we recover the spill yj from the memory written in step j + 1. Finally, we recover xj from the spill yj and the memory written in step j. Updating an xj can be done by recomputing the actions of steps j and j + 1. Spill yj may change in the process, but this only affect the memory written in step j + 1, and does not propagate to yj+1.
Unfortunately, this approach requires N = O(n/ log n) precomputed constants. Indeed, each Yj is distinct, and even the number of bits written to memory in each step varies. This was not a problem in the SOLE encoding, as X = 2 b + 1, so the Yj values could be approximated by an arithmetic progression. Here, X can be far from a power of two, and the behavior of the Yj's can be rather irregular inside a universe of O(n).
A Tree Representation
To reduce the number of precomputed constants to O(log n), we will use a tree structure. As before, we group elements into N values from universe X = Θ(n 2 ). Group these values into a binary tree, as in the standard representation of a heap. This is an implicit representation, i.e. we simply define 2i and 2i + 1 as the children of node i, and i/2 as the parent of node i. Each node will receive two spills, one from each child. It will combine these into a single value yi, and use its own value xi ∈ [X] as the information carrier to store yi. The resulting new spill is propagated to the parent. Note that, even though spills are propagated up, there is no recursion happening at query time. To obtain a value stored in a node v, we go to v's parent and obtain v's spill from the parent's memory bits. Then, we compute v's value from the spill and its own memory bits. To update some xi, we simply reconstruct the encoding of node i and its parent.
The advantage of the arboral representation is that all nodes on a level are handled using O(1) precomputed constants. We have three types of nodes on level log 2 n − k:
• A prefix of the nodes have subtrees that are complete binary trees of height k.
• Following this, at most one node has a subtree that is not complete.
• The remaining nodes have subtrees that are complete binary trees of height k − 1.
The nodes in each of these three classes, from a given level, have identical constants generated by Lemma 4, since the spills from the children are identical by induction. Therefore, for each class of nodes on each level, we need to remember the following information:
• the number of nodes in this class;
• the location of the memory bits from the first node in the class;
• the spill sizes received from the two children;
• the constants of Lemma 4.
The level of node i is log 2 i . We note that this can be computed by O(1) Word RAM operations, as shown in [11] . Once the level is known, we can determine in constant time the class of the node, and retrieve the constants and memory locations necessary for decoding.
The last bit. By the construction from above, the total redundancy introduced by the applications of Lemma 4 is o(1) bits. Up to one bit of redundancy is then lost by rounding when the final spill is stored. Thus, we use n log 2 Σ + o(1) , which could be equal to n log 2 Σ + 1.
As a theoretical amusement, we mention that the space can be reduced to the optimal n log 2 Σ + 1. The idea is that the o(1) term can be made O(n −c ), for any constant c, if one increases X and uses arithmetic on O(c log n)-bit integers. But results on linear forms in logarithms show [2] that n log 2 Σ is bounded away from an integer by 1/n O(1) , for any constant Σ. Thus, setting c high enough will ensure that n log 2 Σ + O(1/n c ) ≤ n log 2 Σ . (For instance, when Σ = {0, 1, 2}, it suffices to set c = 1, 179, 648.)
PREFIX-FREE CODES VIA INFORMA-TION CARRIERS
In this section, we show how to obtain online prefix-free codes of size n + log 2 n + O(log log n), getting exponentially closer to the Elias bound of n + log 2 n + log 2 log 2 n + . . .
We view the input as partitioned into blocks of slowly growing size: after n bits have been seen, the next block (block i) consists of the subsequent 2ki = 2 log 2 n bits. Let N be the number of blocks. As the N -th block may contain anywhere between 1 and 2 log 2 n bits, we treat it specially. We will encode the first N − 1 blocks in a prefix-free way, and then append an Elias encoding for the last block. This Elias code brings an overhead of O(log kN ) = O(log log n) bits.
We view a block as coming from the alphabet [2 k i ] 2 . The reason for blocks of around 2 log 2 n bits is the information carrier lemma: when working with a domain of X, we obtain a redundancy of O(1/ √ X). Thus, a block universe of O(n 2 ) is needed to control the redundancy introduced in each block.
Unfortunately, we cannot afford one block for the eof symbol, since this would cost some 2 log 2 n bits. Instead, in Pass 1 we convert each block of [2
More precisely, we use a buffer of O(log n) bits to introduce a 3-block lag, effectively learning about the end of file 3 blocks in advance.
2 , we replace it by (a, eof), and append b at the very end of the stream (in plaintext). This transformation costs kN−2 ≤ log 2 n bits for the eof symbol. In addition, we pay log 2 2 k i (2
enlarging the alphabet of block i. To understand i 2 −k i , note that there are O(2 K /K) blocks with a fixed value ki = K, so the total cost from fixed K is O(1/K). Summing for K from 1 to log 2 n, we obtain O(log log n) bits of redundancy.
In Pass 2, we convert each block from alphabet [2 by applying Lemma 4 sequentially to all blocks, and feeding one spill into the next application. The redundancy introduced at step i is O(2 −k i ), since the domain is X = O(2 2k i ). As shown above, i 2 −k i = O(log log n). For the decoding, observe that eof was encoded in block N − 2, so it will be detected after output block N − 1 is read (which allows one to decode the spill of input block N − 2, and thus the entire N − 2 block). The decoder can thus stop in time at block N − 1, and run the special decoding for block N , and the second half of block N − 2 displaced by eof.
Overall, the overhead was log 2 n + O(log log n), and the running time per block was constant. addition to k, and output g k (CBC-MAC(k, M )). Although this fix is quite simple, it doubles the size of the secret key, which could be undesirable for some applications. On the other hand, our method makes at most one more calls to the block cipher (due to adding two more blocks in our encoding), and also adds a little bit of complexity due to encoding and decoding procedure (which are simple, but nevertheless need to be done).
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Cascade PRF. Another natural application of the cascade mode is to extend the domain of a pseudorandom function (PRF). Specifically, assume g k is a keyed PRF from b bits to s bits, where s is simultaneously the size of the key k and the output length of g k (m). Define the compression function f (x, m) = gx(m), and set the initial IV = k. Then the classical cascade construction is defined as F k (M ) = Cascade(M, f, k). Namely, the cascade state xi keeps the current PRF key (initially equal to the actual key k), with each iteration using the next message block mi to set the new key xi to the the PRF of the message block mi under the old key xi−1. We also remark that the classical GGM [14] construction of a PRF F k from a length-doubling pseudorandom generator (PRG) G : {0, 1} s → {0, 1} 2s is also a special case of the cascade construction with b = 1. Indeed, the PRG G(k) = (G0(k), G1(k)) above, where |Gm(k)| = s and m ∈ {0, 1}, yields a 1-bit PRF g k (m) = Gm(k).
It is well known [14, 4] that the cascade construction is a secure PRF of variable-length messages if and only if the messages are encoded in a prefix-free form. Intuitively, as long as any two message "diverge" at some point, the resulting key values become random and unrelated. In contrast, the extension attack is particularly simple and devastating.
, so one can easily compute the PRF of any "descendant" (M1, M2) from the PRF of the "ancestor" M1, breaking the pseudorandomness of F k .
The clean fix is to use the NMAC variant [5, 3] , where a fresh key k is stored in addition to k, and one defines NMAC k,k (M ) = g k (G k (M )). Once again, although simple, this doubles the key size of our PRF. Hence, in practice an hoc variant of NMAC is used, called HMAC [5, 3] . HMAC uses a single keyk, and essentially calls NMAC with k = gc(k + ipad) and k = gc(k + opad), where c, ipad, opad are specific constants hardwired into the design of HMAC. This regains the short key size, but now the security analysis requires an ad hoc assumption about our initial PRF g, beyond the fact that it is a PRF. In contrast, using a PFE, one naturally regains a singe key k, has the same number of calls to g k , but adds a little bit of complexity due to on-line encoding/decoding, which is not needed in HMAC.
Merkle-Damgård Hash Functions. The cascade mode of operation is the main technique for building cryptographic hash functions. Such a hash function H should take an arbitrary long message M = (m1, . . . , mn), and produce a short, s-bit hash value H(M ). The minimal requirement for such hash functions is collision-resistance: it should be hard to find M1 = M2 such that H(M1) = H(M2). However, in many applications even stronger properties are needed from H: intuitively, a new value H(M ) should look random and independent from all previous values H(M ) for M = M . This is formalized by modeling H as a random oracle [9] . Of course, in practice one uses concrete hash function H. In fact, practical hash functions, including the current standard SHA and the vast majority of other popular hash functions, precisely use the cascade mode of operations, applied to an appropriate compression function f .
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Specifically, H(M ) is precisely Cascade(M, f, IV ), where f is a publicly known unkeyed hash function from (s + b) to s bits, and IV is a fixed constant. As observed by many papers, and formally addressed by Coron et al. [10] , such design of H makes it very different from a "monolithic" random oracle, even if the compression function f is modeled as a fixed-length random oracle. In particular, the extension attack here is as follows: given y = H(M ) for any unknown value M , one can easily compute the value y = H(M, M ) = Cascade(M , f, y), for any suffix M . Clearly, this should not be possible if H was a true random oracle.
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Coron et al. [10] formally defined what it means to securely extend the domain of a random oracle, and gave four simple ways to provably circumvent extension (and all other generic) attacks. The cleanest solution is to simply encode the message in a PFE! However, prior to our work it was considered too wasteful. The second solution is to truncate a non-trivial fraction of the output bits. Unfortunately, this method suffers from relatively poor exact security (and, of course, gives shorter output). The third solution is similar in spirit to the NMAC PRF solution above, and requires an independent compression function f . which is then applied to Cascade(M, f, IV ). Unfortunately, it is not practically convenient to design two different compression functions f and f . 6 Finally, the last method is similar to the HMAC PRF method above, and could be viewed as an ad hoc trick to avoid having two independent compression functions: it outputs Cascade(Cascade(0 b M, f, IV ), f, IV ). Until our work, this was considered the method of choice, since only one compression function is used, the message can be processed on-line, and only two extra calls to f are made are made. With our on-line PFE, however, we end up making the same number of calls to f , but, arguably, obtain a result which is simpler to understand and explain (in terms of security). Domain Extension of MACs. Another natural usage of the cascade mode is to extend the domain of a message authentication code (MAC) f k : {0, 1} b+s → {0, 1} s . This is different from the CBC-MAC and the cascade-PRF applications above because the building block here is only assumed to be unpredictable, as opposed to pseudorandom (indeed, it is easy to see that the CBC-MAC and the cascade constructions are not always secure if the block cipher or the b-bit PRF are only assumed unpredictable [1]). Still, we can still define Cascade-MAC(k, M ) = Cascade(M, f k , 0 s ), where our compression function f k is keyed by the same key k throughout (so called dedicated-key setting [8] ).
It was observed by Maurer and Sjödin [20] that the Cascade-MAC is secure if M is encoded in a prefix-free form. (The extension attack here is a bit more complicated; we refer to [8] .) On the other hand, without using on-line PFE (which was conjectured to be too wasteful by Maurer and Sjödin), several techniques to overcome this problem are known. The simplest one is to use, once again, an additional key k , and apply f k to the output of the Cascade-MAC(k, M ) (see [20] , which slightly optimizes the earlier suggestion of [1]). Without having two keys, several ad hoc solutions were developed by [20, 8] . While offering comparable efficiency to using the basic cascade construction with our PFE, these solutions are arguably less intuitive than the basic cascade construction.
We also notice that the dedicated key setting can be used for the domain extension of PRFs as well, when f k is a assumed a PRF rather than a MAC (but one gets a PRF back as well). The discussion here is similar to the MAC case.
Multi-Property Preservation. As we have seen, in all the applications that we mentioned, applying the PFE followed by the cascade construction works. Thus, the PFE followed by the cascade construction can be seen as a multiproperty preserving transform (MPPT). As advocated by Bellare and Ristenpart [7, 8] , devising MPPTs is advantageous in terms of reusing the existing implementations of hash functions, by designing compression functions which simultaneously satisfy several desired properties. However, since online PFEs were considered impractical, Bellare and Ristenpart [7, 8] had to work relatively hard to design their MPPTs. Arguably, the "PFE-then-Cascade" is a much simpler MPPT to understand and explain than the MPPTs developed by [7, 8] . Given that our work gives a very efficient PFE, our MPPT also offers roughly the same efficiency than the MPPTs of [7, 8] , so it could be an attractive alternative to those MPPTs.
